We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection ( D ) or "tit for tat" ( T ) , and their total payoffs come from games with the nearest neighbors. During the random seqtfential updates the players adopt one of their neighboring strategies if the chosen neighbor has higher payoff. We compare the effect of two types of external constraints added to the Darwinian evolutionary processes. In both cases the strategy of a randomly chosen player is replaced with probability P by another strategy. In the first case, the strategy is replaced by a randomly chosen one anlong the two others, while in the second case the new strategy is always C . Using generalized mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations the strategy concent,rations are evaluated in the stationary state for different strength of external constraints characterized by the probability P .
INTRODUCTION
The successful applications of game theory in the area of economics and political decisions initiated its increasing development after the second world war [l] . Originally, the game theory is devoted to find the optimal strategy for a given game between two intelligent players. The straightforward developments involve the generalization toward the iterated games of n players with assuniing local interactions among the spatially distributed players. The spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games (SEPDG) has attracted a particular attention because of its applicability in the human and behavior sciences as well as in biology . Nowadays the prisoner's dilemma game is considered to be the metaphor for studying the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals. The emerging cooperation appears to be crucial at many transitions in evolution [7] . The first numerical investigations have shown that the cooperation can be maintained by very simple strategies in t,he iterated games [5] . Very recently it is demonstrated that the players can be as simple as bacteriophages (viruses that infect bacteria) [8, 9] .
In these systems the players wish to maximize their individual income coming from games with other players. The prisoner's dilemma game is a simple version of the two-player matrix games where the players' income depend on their simultaneous choice bet,ween t,wo options. Following the widely accepted expressions each player can choose defection or cooperation with the other player. The defector reaches the highest payoff t (ca.lled temptation to defect) against the cooperator, which receives then the lowest reward s (called sucker's payoff). For mutual cooperation [defection] each player receives the same payoff T (reward for mutual cooperation) [ p (punishment)]. The game is symmetric in the sense that, player's income is independent of the player itself, it depends only on their choice. The mentioned payoff valiies satisfy the inequalities t > r > p > s and 2r > t + s. These assumptions provide the hrgest, total payoff for the mutual cooperators. Comparing to this situation the defector reaches extra income against the cooperator whose loss exceeds the defector's benefit. Consequently, the choice of defection can be interpreted as an exploiting behavior. These are the main features for which the prisoner's dilemma. gamcs are used to study the emergence of mutual cooperation, altruism and ethic norms among selfish individuals [5, 10] .
The rational players should defect as this choice provides the larger income, independently of the partner's decision. However, this situation creates a dilemma for intelligent players as mutual cooperation would result in higher income for each of them t,haii mutual defectlion does.
In the iterated round-robin prisoner's dilemma games we can introduce some simple evolutionary processes without assuming intelligent players (who are capable to find tjhe best, strategy if it exists). These games are started from an initial set of strategies, which defines t,he player's decision in the knowledge of their previous choices. The evolut,ionn,ry process is devoted to model the Darwinian selection principle among 71 (selfish) players whose total income comes from n -1 games within a given round. In the simplest evolutionary models the worst player adopts the winner's strat,egy round by round.
The numerical sin~nlat~ions have demonstrated the crucial role of the so-called "tit for tat" strategy in the emergence of mutual cooperation. Despite of its simplicity the "tit for tat'' strategy won the computer tournaments conducted by Axelrod [5] .
The "tit for tat" strategy cooperates in the first step and then always repeats his co-player's previous decision. This strategy cooperates forever with all the other so-called nice strat,egies which never defect first. Furthermore, its defection and cooperation can be interpreted as a punishment and forgiveness when reacting to the previous decision for other strategies. The most remarkable feature of this strategy is that it is capable to sustain the mutual cooperation among themselves in t,he presence of defectors.
Early numerical investigations have also indicated the importance of local interactions because it favors the formation of cooperating colonies. In the simplest, models the players are distributed on a lattice and the interaction (the games between two player as well as the strategy adoption) is limited to a given neighborhood. Evidently, the short range interactions enha.nce the role of fluctuations at the same time. These models can be well investigated by sophisticated methods of non-equilibrium statistical physics.
For the numerical investigation of the spatial effects Nowak and May [ll] have introduced an SEPDG model, which is equivalent to a t,wo-state cellular automaton.
Each lattice site can be in one of the two states C and D , representing the two simple strategy "always cooperate" and "always defect" respectively. The income for a given player (site) comes from games with its neighbors (and also with itselfin some version of the model). According to the cellular automaton rille the players modify their strategy simultaneously in discrete time steps. Namely, each player adopt,s the best strategy found in its neighborhood. The step by step visualization of the strategy distribution on a two-dimensional lattice exhibits different spatio-temporal patterns (homogeneous and coexisting strategies, transitions between these states, competing interfacial invasions, etc.) depending on the payoff matrix, which is characterized by a single parameter. In these models the randomness is restricted to the initial states. In a subsequent work Nowak et (11. [la] have extended the former models by allowing irrational strategy adoptions with some probability. The sinnilatioiis indicated that the randomness favors the spreading of D strategies. These results have initiated systematic numerical investigations of many stochastic cellular automata [13--161 .
The study of spatio-temporal patterns observed in nature, however, requires continuous time description [17, 11] . Moreover, it is difficult to analyze the above mentioned stochastic cellular automata in the framework of generalized mean-field approximation, which is often used in non-equilibrium physics. To reduce the technical difficulties Szab6 and Toke have suggested a simplified dynamics [18] . The systematic investigations of this model have justified that, when tuning the niodel parameters the stationary state undergoes two consecutive phase transitions which belong to the directed percolation (DP) universality class [18, 16] . Very recently t,his SEPDG model has been extended by allowing three strategies for the players [19] . In the present work this three-strategy model will be cornpared with its sirnplified version. During the model descriptions and discussion, our attention will be focused on the motivations, the elementary processes and their consequences as well as on the universal features relating the SEPDGs to the area of coiriplex systems.
SPATIAL EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH THREE STRATEGIES
In the present spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game the players arc located on the sites x = ( i , j ) of a square lattice, where i , j = 1,. . . , L. To avoid the undesired boundary effects we assume periodic bouridary conditions. Each player follows one of the three strategies: D defects always; C cooperat,es unconditionally;
l' accommodating to the partner's strategy chooses defection against D and cooperation with C and T . In fact the name T refers to the strategy "tit for tat" which first cooperates and l a k r repeats the partner's previous decision. Consequently, after the first step t,he decisions of these two strategies are equivalent against C , D and themselves. The consequences of the different first decisions become irrelevant if the strategy c.hanges (defined below) are rase comparing to the frequency of games. At, the site x the player's strategy is denoted by a three-component unit vector whose possil)le values a,rc corresponding to the D , C , and T strategies respectively. At a given time the state of the whole system is described by the variables s(x).
For each player the total payoff comes from the games with its four nearest neighbors. Using the above formalism the total payoff m ( x ) for the player at site x is given as
where s*(x) is the t.raiispost matrix of s(x) and the summatlion runs over the four nearest neighbors (bx). Accept,ing the simplified payoff matrix suggested by Nowak and May [Ill M is given by the following expression:
whcre the only free parameter b (1 < b < 2 ) measures the temptation to defect. In the above mentioned notation the present payoff matrix corresponds to tlhe choices:
To model the Darwinian selection rule the players are allowed to modify t,heir strategy. In the simplest, case the system evolution is governed by random sequential updates. It means that a ra,ndomly chosen player (e.g. at site x) adopts one of it,s neighboring strategy, s(x -t bx), if m(x + 6x) > m(x) and this elementary process is iterated many times.
Here it is worth ment,ioning that a state consisting only of C and T strategies. leads to a uniform payoff distribution [m(x) = 41 and the above dynamics leaves this state unchanged. An example of a more complicated situation is given in Figure 1 . The payoffs associated with the three different strategies, D , C and T , are explicitly given.
The reader can easily check that inside a D region the defectors receive zero payoffs. The same is t.rue for a solitary T surrounded by defectors. In the absence of C strategies, however, two (or more) neighboring T strategies will invade the D territories because their mutual cooperation gives thciri some incomes, while the defectors' payoff remain zero.
In the presence of C strategies, however, tlie above sitiiatiori becomes quite different as the exploitation provides large incomes for the defeckors. As a result,, the defectors can invade the neighboring C or T sites for some configurations. This process dominates the time evolution for small ?' and large C concentrations as illustrated in a ternary diagram (see Figure 2 ) . Note that the trajectories are two dimensional projections of a many dimensional space. Accordingly, there can be crossing of trajectories. As the average defector's payoff decreases with the C concentration, sooner or later the T +-D invasion proc cs will govern the syst,em evolution and, finally, all the D strategies extinct. Figure 2 shows clearly that the rat,io of C and T strategies in the final (frozen) state depends on the initial state.
It is emphasized that in the absence of T strategies the defectors will dorniIiat,e the present system in the final state. It is not, evident as in Figure 1 one can find many D-C pairs where C beats D. In general, thcse pairs are locat,ed along the horizontal and vertical straight fronts separating the D and C domains. The random sequential invasions, however, makes the smooth fronts irregular arid t'liis sitnation generally prefers the D -+ C invasion to t,he opposite one. As a result, the "sharp" D fronts cut tlie C's domains into small pieces arid finally all the Cs The above dynamical rules introduce some noises (irrational choices) in the system evolution. Now an dditional (superimposing) noisy term is introduced by allowing the appearancc of mutants with probability P . In fact, the effect of two different, external constraints (mutation mechanisms) will be studied in rriodels A and B as a function of P .
Model A
In the first model, tlie above evolutionary rule is modified as follows. Each randomly chosen player adopts with probability P a randomly chosen strategy among the two other st,rat,egies. With probability 1 -P it follows the old rule.
This model can describe the behavior of those biological and economical problems where the appearance of mutants cannot be neglected [4,2]. The main feature of this model is that, this mutation mechanism does not allow the extinction of any strategy.
Model B
In the second model the mutation mechanism is restricted to the adoption of C strategies [19] . In other words, the randomly chosen player adopts the C strategy with probability P , otherwise it adopts one of its neighboring strategy if t)his neighbor has higher income. Note that in this case the extinction of the D and/or T strategies is permitted.
Model B is devoted to describe the effect of an externd constxaint whicd enforcos the cooperative hehavior naively by supporting an unconditional cooperation. Such a phenomenon can be observed in human societies in which any kind of social pressure enforces the D and T players to choose the C strategy. Furthermore, a T player surrounded by only cooperating strategies (C or T ) is motivated to adopt, the C strategy also because of its convenience. In fact,, playing C is simpler than playing T , which requires the knowledge of the previous decision of your neighbors.
MEAN-FIELD APPROXIMATION
In the classical mean-field approximation the systeni is descrilxd by the strategy concentrations which satisfy the normalization condition c D ( t ) + cc;(t) + c~( t ) = 1. In this approach the average payoffs are given as:
For model A, the time dependent concentrations satisfy the following equations of rriotion: In these expressions the first terms describe the effect, of external constraint, the second terms come froin the Darwinian selection niechaIiisrn. After some algebraic manipulations one car1 easily gct the following st,ationary solution (for P < 1):
Here all the three st,rategies are present for arbitrary values of P . Notice that the concentrations of C and T strategies are the same due to the symmetries of Eqs. ( 5 ) . In the limit P -+ 0, however, the concentration of D strategy vanishes.
Evidently, the concentrat,ion of the three strategies becomes equal when the evolution is governed exclusively by the mutation ( P = 1). For model B the corresponding equations of motion are similar to those given by Eqs. (5), the differences appear in the first terms proportional to P . Namely, where the aveIage payoff values are given by Eqs. (4) and the conditions of validity of the u p p e~ arid 1owc.r signs are defined as above. The analytical solution of these equations predicts strikingly different behavior in the stationary state [19] , that is,
while the system gocs t h t,he absorbing state (cc = 1 and C D = c~ = 0) for P > 1/2. The most surprising rwult is t,he extinction of T strategy if P > 0. We have to ernpliasize the non-analytical behavior in the limit P -+ 0. As illustrated in the upper plot of' Figure 3 , without the mutation ( P = 0) the system evolves toward either a homogeneous D state (cg = 1) or a mixed state composed of C and T strategies with a ratio depending on the initial conditions. However, t,he homogeneous D state is unstable against T invasions, therefore in the close vicinity of this stat,e some small perturbations can drive the system toward the state of C S T . Conversely, this mixed state becomes unstable at a given concentration (where m g = m(: = r n T ) against small perturbations increasing cc and c~ simultaneously. In other words, the system evolves t,oward the D dominance when the state is positioned 011 the right hand side of dashed line (see the uppcr plot in Figure 3 as a results of fluctuations. This feature explains why the system is so sensitive to applied external constraints. (mo > m,c = m T ) , cc and r n D decrease while CD and CT increase until one crosses the dashed line. On the left hand side all the initial states tend toward the only fixed point given by Eq. (6). For model B, however, there is no fixed point on the left hand side. In this region the external insertion of C strategies increases the value of cc until 7 n D becomes larger than mc = m T and then the D invasion drives the system toward the fixed point defined by Eq. (8) . During the D invasion the external constraint can conipensate only the loss of C strategies. Consequently, the T strategies die out exponentially fast.
Notice that the variation of b leaves the fixed points unchanged, but modifies only the slope of the dashed line separating the two regions mentioned above.
Within the framework of mean-field theory, the extinction of T strategies is a consequence ofthe fact that here mT = nzc [see Eq. (4)] in contrary to the spatially extended case, its illustrated in Figure 1 . Results for Model A Figure 4 shows a typical strategy distribution for the stationary state at a small value of P . In contrary to the mean-field prediction [see Eqs. (6)] the system is dominated by the T strategies. The randomly inserted D and C strategies form small islands. Occasionally tlir larger C islands are occupied by Ds, however, a consecutive T invasion will rliiniriate t,he larger D territories and maintains the T dominance. At the same time this process prevents the formation of large C islands inside a T domain. One can observe in Figure 5 that when increasing the value of P , the conccntration of D and C strategies increases monot,onously. In t,he limit P 1, tjhe strategy distribution on the lattice tends toward a randoin (uncorrela.ted) one C D = c~ = = 1/3 in agreement with the classical mea.n-field theory [see Ey. (6)]. In this case, instead of the neighbor invasions, tlie system evolutioil is ruled by the stochastic mutation mechanism.
MONTE CARL0 SIMULATIONS
As shown in Figure 5 , the Monte Carlo data agree remarkably well with the results of the pair approximation. This pair approximation is considered as a generalized mean-field theory taking the nearest-neighbor correlations explicitly int,o account.. The details of this calculation are availahlr in many previous works [Is-201. The good agreement refers to the absence of long-range correlations which is observable in the "homogeneous" strategy distribution (see Figure 4) . It is worth mentioning that the pair approximation is capable to dcscrihe the dominance of T strategies in the limit P + 0.
Results for Model B In order to visualize the relevant differences between the two models at small P values the strategy distribution for model I3 is displayed in Figure 6 . When comparing the corresponding snapshots (Figures 4 and 6 ) tlie reader can easily P recognize the most st>riking differences. Namely, the appearance of a strongly correlated spatial st,ruc:tiire for model B. In this case the formation of large C domains inside the sea of T strategies is riot prevented by the random appearance of D mutants as happened in the previous case. The large C domains (white areas in Figure 6 ), however, art: unprotected against, the D invasion. Figure 6 shows some D domains (black awas) invading the C's territ,ories. These D domains are "striplike" because their territ,ories are invaded simultaneously by the T strategies. This iiivasion process is simi1a.r also for larger values of P (but 0 < P < Pcl, see later), and only the average invasion velocity changes. On the other hand, the randomly inserted C stra,tegies survive and accumulate in the T domains. Consequently, far behind the T-D invasion front the T's territory will be occupied by the externally inserted Cs and thcn this area becomes unprotected against the D invasion. Sooner or later this area will be invaded by Ds and the above process repeats itself. This means that, the cyclic invasion maintains a self-organizing domain structure. Here we have to emphasize that t,liis cyclic (rock-scissors-paper game like) dominance is provided by this exteIna1 constraint,.
Similar processes arc ohserved in the forest-fire models [21, 22] introduced by Bak et al. [23] t,o ~iiodel the phenomenon of self-organized criticality. In these models ea,ch cell can bc in one of the following three states: non-burning tree, burning tree and ash. The dynamics are governed by cyclic dominance, similarly to our model B. Note that, t,hti consequence of cyclic invasion with three (01. more) states are studied in Lotka-Volt,rrra models [24] [25] [26] 201 and in cyclically domi~iat~ed voter The symbols are t,hr same its in Figure 4 .
In model B the transition from the T to C st,ate introduces a characteristic length and time unit, both proportional to 1/P. In other words, this length unit is characteristic to the typical (linear) size of the T+C domain, and the t h e unit corresponds to periodic time of cyclic invasion processes at a given site.
When increasing the value of P , the typical size of T+C dorriaiiis decreases arid the concentration of D's increases. It is found that, the T strategies die out if P > Pcl = 0.1329 (1) . Figure 7 shows a typical snapshot in the vicinit,y of t,liis critJical value. In this case the external support is sufficiently strong to maintain siiiall C clusters inside the D domains. The most rernarkable f(:at>ure of this snapshot is that the T's form non-uniformly distributed sniall (isolated) colonies. The ohservation of time evolution of configuration shows that, these T colonies walk randomly, they can extinct spontaneously, a single colony can split int,o two, or two colonies can merge. This phenomenon is analogous to the branching annihilating randorn walks (BARW) exhibiting a critical trarisitiori when varying the control paraine ters [32, 33] . The corresponding critical transitions, both for our model B arid for BARW, belongs to the so-called directed percolation universality class [34, 35] .
For P > Pcl, the concentration of D decreases monotonously if Y is increased and vanishes a t P = Pc2 = 0.3678(1). This extinction proc:ess is sirniliir to thc previous one, i.e. it also belongs to the DP universality class. The similarit,y in t,lie correlations is recognizable in the spatial distribution of the extincting st'rategies when comparing t,hc snw.pshots displayed in Figures 7 and 8.
For P > PCz, ativ initial strate evolves toward the absorbing state where all the players follow the C stra.t,cgy.
The results of our systmiat,ic investigations are summarized in Figure 9 . Systematic riumerical investligations in the close vicinity of the critical points show that the vanishing concent,ra,tions follow the same power law behavior. Namely, in the limits P,, -P + 0 and Pc:2 -P -+ 0 respectively and = 0.57(3) in both cases [19] . Within the statistical error this value of the exponent /? agrees with the one of the 2+1 tlirneiisional directed percolation [36, 37] .
As expect,ed, these critical transitions are accompanied with the divergence of concentration fluct,uations, i.e. in the vicinity of thc corresponding critical points. The numerical fitting yields y = 0.37 (9) in agrcement, with the DP values [36, 37, 34, 35] .
Despite the same universal behavior there is a remarkable difference between the two extinction processes. The second extinction process (at P = Pc2) results in a J.
-. I frozen (time independent) absorbing state. Conversely, the transition at P = Pcl is an example where the extinction of T strategies happens on a fluctuating background. In other words, tlie properties of the absorbing state (frozen or fluctuating) do not affect the critical behavior of our model.
As demonstrated in Figure 9 the results of Monte Carlo simulations are reproduced qualitatively well by the pair approximation [19] . The striking differences are related to the long-range correlations accompanying the critical transitions at P = Pcl and P,.. . Due to the strongly correlated domain structure, illustrated in Figure 6 , the largest, deviation can be observed for small P values. We note that the concentration fluctuations, defined by Eq. (lo), also diverge in the limit P -+ 0.
Unfortunately, in this particular case, we could not deduce a reliable value for the exponent y because of the significant size effects. Further systematic analyzes are required to clarify what, happens in this limit.
CONCLUSIONS
We have studied yuantit,at,ively the effect of external constraints on the emergence of cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with three possible strategies (cooperation, defection and tit for tat). In the present spatial model the players are distributed on a square lattice and their interact,ions are restricted to nearest neighbors. The Darwinian selection rule is modeled by the adoption of t,he neighboring successful st,rategies. This evolutionary process is superimposed by t,wo types of niiit,ation mechanisms (external constraints) whose strength is characterized by a control paranirter P .
The choice of these tliree possible strategies yields non-analytical behavior in the limit, P + 0 for hotli the niean-field approximation and Monte Carlo simulation.
The time-depentlent predictions of mean-field theory are sensitive to the small pert,urbations. According to the I\ilont,e Carlo simulations, in the absence of external constraint the system tends toward a frozen state composed from C and T strategies whose ratio depends on the initial concentrations. For both types of external constmints (models A and B) the system evolves toward a stationary state independently of the initial condition, and the defector concentration vanishes linearly as P + 0. In the limit, P 4 0, however, model A and B will exhibit different ratio of C and T strategies. This difference is related to the appearance of self-organizing patterns for model B. The present investigation indicates that such a society of strategies (or species) are very sensitive to the type of external supports (or the ration of niutation rates). Tlie measure of miitual cooperation can be well characterized by the average payoff whose maxiriiuin (4) can be reached only in the absence of defectors. Figure 10 compares the Mont,c Carlo results for the models A and B. Surprisingly, for weak external support (small P ) the average payoff is larger for model A than for model B. In contrary to tlie naive expectation, the weak support of defenseless coopera-tors results in opposite consequence. Namely, this rnechanism feeds the defectors and simultaneously prevents their elimination by the retaliatory ( T ) strategies.
Examples from the political and economical world justifies the abo17e conc:lusions. In general, the exploiters are preferred by the government,al support for the defenseless layer of a society. The most dangerous effect is the reduction in the T type population which can maintain the rnutual cooperation a.gainst the exploiters. From the view point of cooperation, it is better to help those individuals who are able to prevent themselves against the exploitation. Evidently, for sufficiently large I' values the random insertion of C strategies can provide their dominance. In this case the A type external support is preferred to the B one if we wish to improve cooperation. Above a threshold value this type of external constraints yields a homogeneous C state which is defenseless against any defector appearing occasionally in a real system. Further systematic research is required to clarify what happens in those models where the Imitation mechanism is charact,erized by three independent control parameters.
The present study confirms that the T strategy is able to prevent the spreading of defection in the spatial models. We have to emphasize, however, that according to the simplest mean-field theory, T dies out if the external support is of I3 type.
Consequently, the defectors will dominate those systems where the mean-field theory is exact (e.g. infinite range of interaction, or randomly chosen partnership). In these mean-field like systems, the games between the "parent " arid "its offspring" is not emphasized (they are not iieighbors), which is an advantage for the defectors comparing to spatially extended models. In the light of this feat,ure our investigations imply many interesting questions related to the transition from the "short. range" spatially extended systems t o the "long range" of mean-field like ones.
